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 2 
Abstract 26 
Microbial cooperation typically consists in the sharing of secreted metabolites (referred to as 27 
public goods) within the community. Although public goods generally promote population 28 
growth, they are also vulnerable to exploitation by cheating mutants, which no longer 29 
contribute, but still benefit from the public goods produced by others. While previous studies 30 
have identified a number of key factors that prevent the spreading of cheats, little is known 31 
about how these factors interact and jointly shape the evolution of microbial cooperation. 32 
Here, we address this issue by investigating the interaction effects of cell diffusion, cell 33 
density, public goods diffusion and durability (factors known to individually influence costs 34 
and benefits of public goods production) on selection for cooperation. To be able to quantify 35 
these effects across a wide parameters space, we developed an individual-based simulation 36 
platform, consisting of digital cooperator and cheater bacteria inhabiting a finite continuous 37 
two-dimensional toroidal surface. Our simulations, which closely mimic microbial micro-38 
colony growth, revealed that: (a) either reduced cell diffusion (which keeps cooperators 39 
together) or reduced public goods diffusion (which keeps the public good closer to the 40 
producer) is essential but also sufficient for cooperation to be promoted; (b) the sign of 41 
selection for or against cooperation can change as a function of cell density and in interaction 42 
with diffusion parameters; and (c) increased public goods durability has opposing effects on 43 
the evolution of cooperation depending on the level of cell and public goods diffusion. Our 44 
work highlights that interactions among key parameters of public goods cooperation give rise 45 
to complex fitness landscapes, a finding that calls for multi-factorial approaches when 46 
studying microbial cooperation in natural systems. 47 
  48 
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Introduction 49 
Research over the past decade has revealed that microbes exhibit a multitude of cooperative 50 
behaviours (Crespi, 2001; Velicer, 2003; West et al., 2007a). Microbes form fruiting bodies 51 
(Velicer & Vos, 2009; Strassmann & Queller, 2011) and biofilms (Nadell et al., 2009), 52 
communicate with each other through the release and perception of signalling molecules 53 
(Bassler & Losick, 2006), and share secreted beneficial metabolites (i.e. public goods) among 54 
community members (West et al., 2007a). Public goods secretion seems to be the most 55 
prominent form of cooperation, with examples comprising the release of enzymes to digest 56 
food (Greig & Travisano, 2004; Bachmann et al., 2011), chelators to scavenge essential 57 
metals (Griffin et al., 2004), toxins to fight competitors (Inglis et al., 2009), and 58 
biosurfactants for cooperative swarming (Xavier et al., 2011). 59 
Despite the community-level benefits that arise from sharing metabolites (Ross-60 
Gillespie et al., 2007), public goods cooperation is not straightforward to explain. This is 61 
because natural selection is predicted to favour cheating mutants, which no longer contribute 62 
to the public good, but still benefit from the cooperative acts performed by others (West et al., 63 
2006; Rankin et al., 2007; Ghoul et al., 2014). A wealth of research has focused on 64 
understanding the factors that promote public goods cooperation in the light of the prevalent 65 
risk of cheater exploitation.  This research has demonstrated that the evolutionary success of 66 
microbial cooperation depends on many factors, including strain frequency (Gilbert et al., 67 
2007; Ross-Gillespie et al., 2007; Gore et al., 2009), cell density (Greig & Travisano, 2004; 68 
Ross-Gillespie et al., 2009), resource availability (Brockhurst et al., 2008; Kümmerli et al., 69 
2009b), cell dispersal (Chao & Levin, 1981; MacLean & Brandon, 2008; Kümmerli et al., 70 
2009a; Refardt et al., 2013; Julou et al., 2013), diffusion of public goods (Kümmerli et al., 71 
2009a; Le Gac & Doebeli, 2010), durability of public goods (Kümmerli & Brown, 2010), 72 
regulatory mechanisms that allow an optimal timing of public goods production (Kümmerli & 73 
Page 10 of 37Journal of Evolutionary Biology
 4 
Brown, 2010; Xavier et al., 2011; Darch et al., 2012), and pleiotropic effects emerging from 74 
the genetic architecture of social traits (Driscoll et al., 2011; Dandekar et al., 2012). 75 
While this body of experimental work, as a whole, demonstrates the complexity of 76 
microbial public goods cooperation, individual studies usually focussed on the impact of a 77 
single factor at the time (see Brockhurst et al., 2010 as an exception). Here, we aim to 78 
investigate how key factors of public goods cooperation interact, thereby jointly influencing 79 
microbial sociality. Because laboratory experiments usually impose constraints with regard to 80 
the number of factors and parameter combinations that can simultaneously be looked at, we 81 
developed an individual-based simulation platform, consisting of digital microbes growing on 82 
a finite off-lattice (i.e. continuous space) two-dimensional toroidal surface with connected 83 
boundaries. This platform allowed us to realistically mimic microbial cooperation in 84 
microcolonies (Fig. 2, Movie S1), and thus, to conduct simulations (i.e. in silico experiments), 85 
explicitly exploring interaction effects across a large parameter space. 86 
We considered two strains of digital microbes: a public-good-producing strain 87 
(henceforth cooperator) and a non-public-good-producing strain (henceforth cheat). Both 88 
strains had the same basic growth rate, and could move across the surface, according a cell 89 
diffusion parameter. When public goods production was enabled, cooperators produced public 90 
goods with specified molecular properties (i.e. diffusion, durability) at a constant rate 91 
entailing a fixed cost c per molecule. The public goods generate a fixed benefit b for any 92 
individual taking up a molecule from the environment, whereby b > c, with the cumulative 93 
effects of b and c feeding into the specific growth rate of each individual. We implemented a 94 
microbial life cycle that involved a cellular growth phase followed by a discrete division 95 
event (Fig. 1). Moreover, through the implementation of a density-dependent death rate, we 96 
could manipulate the time needed for microcolonies to reach carrying capacity. Series of 97 
growth and division ended whenever the toroidal environment was close to saturation (Fig. 2). 98 
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We used our platform to quantify the fitness of cooperators and cheats, and the sharing 99 
of public goods in the community as a function of cell diffusion and density, as well as public 100 
goods diffusion and durability. Theoretical work has revealed that both cell diffusion 101 
(determining to which degree cooperators stay together) and public goods diffusion 102 
(determining the scale over which metabolites can be shared) significantly impact the 103 
evolution of public goods cooperation (Allison, 2005; Ross-Gillespie et al., 2009; Driscoll & 104 
Pepper, 2010; Allen et al., 2013; Borenstein et al., 2013). Here, we quantify the interaction 105 
effects between these important parameters. In addition, we assess the role of public goods 106 
durability in interaction with cell and public goods diffusion. Molecular durability is an 107 
important property of secreted molecules because it determines the time a public good 108 
remains available for both cooperators and cheats. However, its impact on the evolution of 109 
microbial cooperation is controversial because some have argued that increased durability is 110 
always beneficial for cooperation in colonies (Allen et al., 2013), whereas others have shown 111 
that it can also hinder cooperation in a meta-population because cheats have access to public 112 
goods for extended periods of time, even following local cooperator extinction (Brown & 113 
Taddei, 2007; Kümmerli & Brown, 2010). Finally, we study the interaction between cell 114 
density and the diffusion properties of cells/public goods by: (a) comparing the performance 115 
of cooperators and cheats during early versus late stages of microcolony formation; and (b) 116 
varying the density-dependent death rate, which allowed us to manipulate the time 117 
microcolonies spent at high cell density. While empirical work showed that low cell density 118 
favours cooperation when public goods diffusion is reduced (Greig & Travisano, 2004; Ross-119 
Gillespie et al., 2009), its impact on the evolution of public goods cooperation under 120 
conditions where cell and/or public goods diffuse more readily are unclear.  121 
 122 
 123 
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Materials and methods 124 
In silico bacterial habitat 125 
We created a finite, two-dimensional continuous (off-lattice) landscape with double-precision 126 
numbers. The landscape forms a torus of 40 x 40 µm (1600 µm2) with connected boundaries, 127 
in which bacteria were seeded and allowed to grow and divide according to specific rules (see 128 
below). All simulations were performed using an agent-based multidimensional (2D) 129 
framework. 130 
 131 
Bacterial life cycle 132 
At the start of each simulation, we seeded two bacteria, one public-good producer and one 133 
non-producer cell, to random locations onto the landscape. Each bacterium was implemented 134 
as a filled disk with a radius of 1 µm at the start of its life cycle. The bacteria then started 135 
growing, whereby the growth of public-good producers  and non-producers  is defined 136 
by the following recursive functions 137 
 + 1 = 
 +  ∑  −          (1) 138 
and 139 
 + 1 = 
 +  ∑          (2) 140 
where  is a strictly positive number representing the growth rate. The other parameters in (1) 141 
and (2) are	∑  , the total number of public goods consumed, and  and  the benefit and the 142 
cost values respectively of public goods production (with  = 0.01 and  = 0.001). 143 
Cell growth was followed by division (Fig. 1), which automatically occurred when a 144 
cell reached the threshold radius of 2 µm. Cell division created a mother and a daughter cell 145 
of equal size, such that the sum of the surface area of both mother and daughter cells equalled 146 
the surface area of the parental cell. The position of the daughter relative to its mother was 147 
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determined by drawing a random value between 0 and 2 . Following positioning, cells 148 
resumed growth. 149 
Between the discrete rounds of growth, cells were free to move in any direction on the 150 
landscape, whereby diffusion was specified by the cell diffusion parameter . In biological 151 
terms, this parameter combines both active cell movement and passive diffusion. The 152 
diffusion process followed a Gaussian random walk, with a Gaussian random number 153 
generator based on the Box-Muller transforms that convert uniformly distributed random 154 
numbers (Box & Muller, 1958; Thomas et al., 2007). 155 
Because cell diffusion and division may result in cells overlapping with each other, we 156 
had to implement a spatial correction process. Specifically, we incorporated an algorithm, 157 
which is applied at every step when the size of a cell is incremented according to equation (1) 158 
or (2). The moves are controlled by a variable factor proportional to the distance between two 159 
neighbouring cells   and . The new position 

 is computed as 160 

 = 
  + !"#
  − #        (3) 161 
where ! is set empirically to 0.1 and "	is a uniform random number drawn between 0 and 1. 162 
The algorithm uses a pairwise comparison to remove any spatial overlap between adjacent 163 
cells. 164 
Finally, we implemented cell death, whereby the probability of dying of any given 165 
individual was proportional to its local cell density, computed as 166 
$%  = &10
'(	)"* ≥ ,"
otherwise           (4) 167 
where * is the actual size of the population and ,	the local number of cells. Hence, when the 168 
actual size of the population *	is larger than the number of cells in a given neighbourhood of 169 
perimeter %, the probability of dying for a cell is increasing. To adjust the value of * with 170 
reference to the value of ,  we used the scaling parameter ) . We also implemented a 171 
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controller that allows us to switch on and off equation (4) and activate cell death only when 172 
the colony achieved a given size. Typically, this size would correspond to a specific number 173 
of cells. 174 
Cycles of growth, division and death ended when the population reached the carrying 175 
capacity K = 500. In the absence of death, K was reached after eight doublings, a number of 176 
generations that correspond to growth patterns typically observed under conditions where 177 
public goods are important for growth (Dumas & Kümmerli, 2012). With K > 500, it became 178 
increasingly time-consuming for our current computing resources to apply our spatial 179 
correction process (equation 3) to find a solution where cells do not overlap. 180 
 181 
Public goods production and durability 182 
Cooperator cells produced public goods at a constant rate (one molecule per second). Public 183 
goods appear as point-like particles, characterized by a specific coefficient of diffusion 5, 184 
and durability 6. The diffusion of public goods was determined by a Gaussian random walk 185 
using the Box-Muller transforms. Public goods are submitted to the same boundary conditions 186 
as cells. The consumption of public goods by cells requires a co-localization of the public 187 
good position within the surface area of a cell. Upon consumption, the public good is 188 
removed from the system. Based on these settings, the public good used in our simulations is 189 
similar to the sugars fructose and glucose made available through the catalytic action of 190 
invertase (i.e. the enzyme embedded in the cellular membrane that hydrolysis sucrose, 191 
MacLean & Brandon, 2008). 192 
Public goods durability 6 was characterized using the exponential decay function 193 
789:;/= < "           (5) 194 
with ? = 0.1, defining the stiffness of the decay, and Δ =  − A. Hence, public goods are 195 
removed based on the likelihood of drawing a random number " smaller than	789:;/=. 196 
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Simulations with digital bacteria 197 
We performed two sets of simulations. In the first set, we simultaneously varied cell dispersal 198 
  (parameter range 0.0001 – 5 µm2/s, in steps of 0.5 µm2/s), public goods diffusion 5 199 
(0.005 – 9 µm2/s, in steps of 1 µm2/s) and public goods durability 6 (10 – 4510 s, in steps of 200 
500 s), resulting in 1100 parameter combinations. In the second set, we simultaneously varied 201 
cell dispersal and public goods diffusion (as before), and death rate (parameter range 0.00005 202 
– 0.04) in steps of 0.01, resulting in 550 parameter combinations. We run 500 replicates for 203 
each parameters combination. 204 
In all experiments, individuals had fixed strategies (i.e. either public goods producer or 205 
non-producer), with no possibilities for mutations to occur (although this option is 206 
implemented in the code for future studies). After each simulation, we extracted data on the 207 
mean time between two cell divisions (our measure of absolute fitness), the relative frequency 208 
of cooperators and cheats (our measure of relative fitness, measured every 200 seconds), and 209 
the mean per capita public good uptake rate for cooperators and cheats. The mean time 210 
between two cell divisions for a given simulation was calculated by averaging across cells. 211 
 212 
Results and discussion 213 
Interaction between cell and public goods diffusion 214 
We found evidence for interactions between cell and public goods diffusion in shaping the 215 
evolution of cooperation, as indicated by the non-parallel lines in Fig. 3. For instance, our 216 
simulations revealed that increased cell and public good diffusion concomitantly selected 217 
against cooperation across most of the parameter space, but not when public goods diffusion 218 
was low. Here, cooperators divided more quickly and were consistently favoured regardless 219 
of the extent of cell diffusion (Fig. 3a+b, Fig. S1). This pattern can be explained by the fact 220 
that, with low public goods diffusion, the range across which secreted metabolite can be 221 
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shared is greatly reduced, which results in producers increasingly benefiting from their own 222 
molecules (Kümmerli et al., 2009a). Indeed, we found that the cheaters’ public good uptake 223 
rates were significantly reduced (Fig. 3c, Fig. S1), and the time they needed to divide greatly 224 
increased (Fig. 3b, Fig. S1) with low public goods diffusion (especially when cell diffusion 225 
was low, too). This shows that metabolite secretion becomes less social with lower public 226 
goods diffusion. Nonetheless, our simulations revealed that, even with minimal public good 227 
and cell diffusion, secreted metabolites remained accessible to cheats to some extent (Fig. 3c, 228 
Fig. S1), which shows that a complete privatization of secreted metabolites is not possible in 229 
our system.  230 
 Furthermore, we found that cooperators divided more quickly and were always 231 
favoured when cell diffusion was minimal (Fig. 3a+b, Fig. S1) regardless of the degree of 232 
public goods diffusion. Increased public good diffusion simply slowed down the spreading of 233 
cooperation, but never changed the direction of selection even with realistically high public 234 
goods diffusion rates. The cooperators’ success can be explained by the observation that 235 
public goods producers and cheats formed spatially separated microcolonies (see Fig. 2 for an 236 
example), such that public goods were mainly shared among cooperators (i.e. clonemates) 237 
within colonies, even with high public goods diffusion (Fig. 3c, Fig. S1). Thus, our 238 
simulations reveal that, across a biologically realistic range of public goods diffusion rates, 239 
highly limited cell diffusion is sufficient to favour cooperation. In natural settings, limited 240 
dispersal is presumably common and might be induced either passively, e.g. in viscous media 241 
where microbial mobility is physically constraint (Wang & Or, 2013), or actively, by the 242 
microbes themselves, for example through the secretion of extracellular polymeric substances 243 
(Flemming & Wingender, 2010). 244 
 Our finding that local sharing of public goods among clonemates favours cooperation 245 
is in accordance with inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964), which predicts that altruistic 246 
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forms of cooperation can be selected for when the benefit (b) of cooperation preferentially 247 
accrues to relatives ( % , i.e. other cooperators), such that %  outweighs the cost   of 248 
cooperation (% > , see Gilbert et al., 2007; Chuang et al., 2010; Kümmerli et al., 2010 for 249 
microbial examples).  However, it is important to note that limited dispersal does not 250 
inevitably favour cooperation, as it also increases local competition among relatives, which 251 
opposes the evolution of cooperation (Taylor, 1992). One likely explanation for why local 252 
competition seems to play a minor role in our experiments is that microcolonies can expand 253 
(i.e. export the benefit of cooperation Fig. 2, movie S1), a factor that has been shown to 254 
attenuate local competition (Lehmann et al., 2006; Alizon & Taylor, 2008).  255 
When cell and public goods diffusion co-varied, cooperation was only favoured with 256 
very low cell and public goods diffusion. Across the remaining parameters space, cheater 257 
increased in frequency (Fig. 3a, Fig. S1). Crucially, our simulations show that cheaters could 258 
spread even when having lower public good uptake rates than cooperators (Fig. 3c, Fig. S1, 259 
cheater generally had lower public good uptake rates, except for Dpg = 3). This pattern is 260 
compatible with the view that a public good is usually close to its producer immediately upon 261 
secretion, and only later, through diffusion, it can reach other cells (Driscoll & Pepper, 2010; 262 
Julou et al., 2013). Thus, our result resolves a recent debate in the literature (Zhang & Rainey, 263 
2013; Kümmerli & Ross-Gillespie, 2014; Ghoul et al., 2014) by showing that equal sharing of 264 
a secreted metabolite is not a precondition for a trait to be considered cooperative. Instead, a 265 
trait is cooperative when others than the producers themselves gain some benefit from the 266 
cooperative act (West et al., 2007b), regardless of the magnitude of that benefit - a condition 267 
that was satisfied across our entire parameter space (Fig. 3c, Fig. S1). 268 
The fitness landscape arising from cell and public goods diffusion (Fig. 3a, Fig. S1) 269 
suggests that there are two principle routes by which natural selection can promote public 270 
goods cooperation in environments with high potentials for diffusion (e.g. open sea water). It 271 
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can either favour: (i) behaviours that reduce bacterial dispersal, for instance, through the 272 
formation of biofilms on substrates; or (ii) secreted metabolites with extremely reduced 273 
diffusion properties. Evidence from empirical studies on marine bacteria indeed indicates that 274 
one or the other route has been taken (Martinez et al., 2003; Cordero et al., 2012). 275 
 276 
Interaction between cell density and diffusion parameters 277 
Apart from the effect that shifts in strain frequency were less pronounced during early vs. late 278 
stages of microcolony formation (because fewer cell divisions occurred), we also found that 279 
the sign of selection (for or against cooperation) can change in function of cell density (Fig 280 
3a+d, Fig. S1); especially with minimal cell diffusion and relatively high public goods 281 
diffusion. Here, cooperation was selected against during early phases of the colony life cycle 282 
(i.e. at low cell density, Fig. 3d, Fig. S1), whereas the pattern reversed at later stages of 283 
microcolony growth (i.e. at high cell density, Fig. 3a, Fig. S1). This pattern is in line with the 284 
observation that at early stages of microcolony formation, there are only one or a few 285 
cooperators around (Fig. 2), such that most of their public goods immediately diffuse out of 286 
their reach, thereby becoming highly accessible to cheats. Only later, once larger 287 
microcolonies have formed, increased public-goods sharing within cooperator microcolonies 288 
becomes possible, giving cooperators a fitness advantage. 289 
An opposite change in the strength of selection emerged with relatively low public 290 
goods (e.g. Dpg = 1) and relatively high cell (Dc ≥ 2) diffusion (Fig. 3a+d, Fig. S1). In this 291 
area of our parameter space, we seemingly recover the findings by Ross-Gillespie et al. 292 
(2009), where cooperation is favoured at low cell density, presumably because cheats have 293 
limited access to a poorly diffusing public good. However, this initial drop in cheater 294 
frequency is then compensated at higher cell densities, when the public good becomes more 295 
abundant and more evenly mixed across cells. 296 
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 When we allowed microcolonies to grow at high cell density for extended periods of 297 
time (owing to the implementation of a density-dependent death rate), we found that under 298 
conditions of high diffusion, the increase in cheater frequency became more pronounced (Fig. 299 
4, Fig. S2). Under conditions of low diffusion, meanwhile, higher death rates had either a 300 
minor or a positive effect on the evolution of cooperation. These patterns can be explained by 301 
the fact that death rate increases the number of generations that are needed to reach carrying 302 
capacity, which gives the dominating strain more time to translate its relative fitness benefits 303 
into frequency shifts. 304 
 These results highlight that attention must be paid to temporal effects during microbial 305 
population growth, where strength and direction of selection can vary considerably over a 306 
short period of time. In practice, these temporal effects are often ignored, and competition 307 
assays are typically run for a fixed amount of time (e.g. for 24 or 48 hours). Such temporal 308 
effects have so far only been suggested to play a role across longer time-scales, through eco-309 
evolutionary feedbacks, whereby selection for cheats lowers population density, which in turn 310 
tempers the spreading of cheats (Ross-Gillespie et al., 2007; Ross-Gillespie et al., 2009; 311 
Sanchez & Gore, 2013). 312 
 313 
Interaction between public goods durability and diffusion parameters 314 
Our simulations revealed significant interactions between public goods durability, and cell 315 
and public goods diffusion (Fig. 5, Fig. S3). Under conditions of high public goods diffusion 316 
(which generally disfavours cooperation), high public goods durability greatly dampened the 317 
selective advantage of cheats (Fig. 5, Fig. S3). Why does extended durability, in interaction 318 
with high public goods diffusion, reduce cheater fitness?  To answer that question, let us 319 
consider how the net benefits (for cooperators: Σ − ,	for cheats Σ , see equations 320 
1+2) of public goods production/uptake alters in function of durability. Because cooperators 321 
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produce public goods at a constant rate, variation in durability does not alter the production 322 
costs c. However, extended durability augments Σ  because it increases the time molecules 323 
stay in the environment, thereby increasing public goods availability and uptake rates (Σ). 324 
Consequently, the net benefit for cooperators and cheats tend to converge with more durable 325 
public goods, thereby giving cheats less of an advantage. Important to note is that in natural 326 
systems, durability might feed back on c. For instance, public goods are often facultatively 327 
expressed in response to their need, which enables microbes to down-scale their investment 328 
when public goods are more durable (Kümmerli & Brown, 2010) – a regulatory response that 329 
is expected to further converge the net benefits of the two competing strains. 330 
 Under conditions of low cell and public goods diffusion, meanwhile, extended 331 
durability had either a minor or even a negative effect on the selection for cooperation (Fig. 5, 332 
Fig. S3). For instance, when  = 5 = 1, the increase in the frequency of cooperators is 333 
much more pronounced with low (from 0.5 to 0.75) than high (from 0.5 to 0.64) public goods 334 
durability. This pattern can be explained by the fact that cooperators and cheats form distinct 335 
microcolonies with low cell diffusion, whereby neighbouring cells touch each other, and can 336 
therefore exchange the public goods immediately upon secretion (e.g. see Julou et al., 2013). 337 
Because of this immediate exchange, extended durability is disadvantageous as it results in an 338 
increased fraction of public-good molecules leaking out of the cooperator microcolony, 339 
eventually reaching cheats. 340 
 341 
Conclusions 342 
Our simulations based on digital microbes proved useful in disentangling the complex 343 
interactions between key components of microbial public goods cooperation, such as cell 344 
diffusion, density and mortality, as well as public goods diffusion and durability. We 345 
recovered complex fitness landscapes and changes in the direction of selection across our 346 
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parameter space. These findings demonstrate that the effect of a single factor on the evolution 347 
of microbial public goods cooperation can only be interpreted correctly in the context of these 348 
interaction effects. For instance, the predominant view that high public goods diffusion is 349 
detrimental for the maintenance of public goods cooperation (Allison, 2005; Driscoll & 350 
Pepper, 2010; Allen et al., 2013; Borenstein et al., 2013) holds only for some areas of our 351 
parameter space (Fig. 3a), but not for conditions where cell diffusion was minimal. Here, 352 
cooperation was favoured (although at a lower rate) even when public goods diffusion was 353 
relatively high. Taken together, our simulations reveal that previously identified key factors of 354 
cooperation interact and thereby jointly shape the evolution of social interactions in microbes 355 
– an insight that will hopefully spur future experimental work in real microbial systems. 356 
More generally, the simulation framework developed in this study, which realistically 357 
mimics microbial growth under conditions as occurring in well-shaken test tubes (i.e. with 358 
high cell and public good diffusion), as well as agar plates and single-layer biofilms (i.e. with 359 
reduced cell diffusion, Fig. 2), is expandable, and can be used in the future to elucidate further 360 
important aspects of microbial public goods cooperation. For example, there is the possibility 361 
to manipulate nutrient supply (Brockhurst et al., 2008), and strain frequency (Ross-Gillespie 362 
et al., 2007), two other important aspects influencing microbial public goods cooperation, as 363 
well as allowing mutations to arise to simulate experimental evolution (Harrison et al., 2008; 364 
Dumas & Kümmerli, 2012). Moreover, it would be interesting to see how the mode of action 365 
of a public good affects evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. While we simulated a public 366 
good that can generate immediate benefits (analogous to the sugars made publically available 367 
through the catalytic action of the membrane-bound invertase in yeast Greig & Travisano, 368 
2004), other secreted metabolites, such as siderophores (to bind iron; Griffin et al., 2004) and 369 
proteases (to digest tissue; Diggle et al., 2007) must first diffuse away from the cell to engage 370 
in a chemical reaction with a substrate before they can generate benefits. 371 
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Figure Legends 384 
Figure 1. Flowchart depicting the numerical process by which each digital cell grows and 385 
divides on a continuous (off-lattice) surface. The horizontal arrow indicates spatial growth 386 
(from A to B and from C to D), while the vertical arrow indicates successive division events 387 
(from A to C and from C to E). During individual growth, the radius of the disk is increased 388 
until it reaches a specific length. At each division, two new disks, whose total surface equals 389 
the original one (not shown in the figure), replace the original disk. The position of the two 390 
new disks is placed along an axis randomly oriented between 0 and 2. 391 
 392 
Figure 2. Snapshots of a typical simulation showing microcolony growth of cooperators 393 
(green disks) and cheats (purple disks) with  = 0.0005, 5 = 5, 6 = 510, E = 0.0005. N and 394 
C indicate the total number of cells and the proportion of cooperators, respectively. 395 
  396 
Figure 3. Plots depicting (a) the relative frequency of cooperators at carrying capacity K = 397 
500, (b) the mean time needed for cooperators (solid lines) and cheats (dash-dotted lines) to 398 
divide, and (c) the mean public good uptake rates of the two strains, as a function of cell 399 
diffusion (varying along the x-axis) and public goods diffusion (varying from low to high 400 
following the indicated heat map). (d) Plot showing the relative frequency of cooperators after 401 
1/3 of the time needed to reach carrying capacity K. Mean values have been calculated on the 402 
basis of 500 independent runs. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean. They 403 
are about the size of the lines connecting the data points. Public goods durability and death 404 
rate were kept constant at 6 = 510, E = 0.00005. 405 
 406 
Figure 4. Relative cooperator frequency at carrying K = 500, as a function of cell diffusion 407 
(varying along the x-axis), public goods diffusion (varying from low to high following the 408 
Page 24 of 37Journal of Evolutionary Biology
 18 
indicated heat map), and death rate (E = 0.00005 for dash-dotted lines; E = 0.04 for solid lines). 409 
Mean values have been calculated on the basis of 500 independent runs. Error bars 410 
correspond to the standard error of the mean. They are about the size of the lines connecting 411 
the data points. Public goods durability was kept constant at 6 = 510. 412 
 413 
Figure 5. Plot of the relative cooperator frequency at carrying K = 500, as a function of cell 414 
diffusion (varying along the x-axis), public goods diffusion (varying from low to high 415 
following the indicated heat map), and public goods durability (6 = 10 for dash-dotted lines; 6 416 
= 4510 for solid lines). Mean values have been calculated on the basis of 500 independent 417 
runs. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean. They are about the size of the 418 
lines connecting the data points. Death rate was kept constant at E = 0.00005. 419 
 420 
Supplementary Information 421 
Figure S1. Landscapes depicting (a) the relative frequency of cooperators, (b) the absolute 422 
fitness of cooperators (green) and cheats (purple), and (c) the mean public good uptake rates 423 
of the two strains as a function of cell and public goods diffusion. In (a), the blue dots and the 424 
blue interpolated surface show cooperator frequency during the early stages of microcolony 425 
formation (i.e. after 1/3 of the time needed to reach carrying capacity K), whereas the red dots 426 
and surface depict cooperator frequency at K = 500. Mean values have been calculated on the 427 
basis of 500 independent runs and are depicted by dots. Error bars correspond to the standard 428 
error of the mean. They are about the size of the data points. Public goods durability and 429 
death rate were kept constant at 6 = 510, E = 0.00005. 430 
 431 
Figure S2. Landscape of the relative cooperator frequency at carrying K = 500 as a function 432 
of cell diffusion, public goods diffusion and death rate (E = 0 for blue dots and surface; E = 433 
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0.04 for red dots and surface). Mean values have been calculated on the basis of 500 434 
independent runs. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean. They are about the 435 
size of the data points. Public goods durability was kept constant at 6 = 510. 436 
 437 
Figure S3. Landscape of the relative cooperator frequency at carrying K = 500 as a function 438 
of cell diffusion, public goods diffusion and public goods durability (6 = 10 for blue dots and 439 
surface; 6 = 4510 for red dots and surface). Mean values have been calculated on the basis of 440 
500 independent runs. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean. They are about 441 
the size of the data points. Death rate was kept constant at E = 0.00005. 442 
 443 
Movie S1. A computer animation visualizing micro-colony growth in a mixed population of 444 
cooperators (green disks) and cheats (purple disks). The animation shows that cheats divide 445 
more quickly during the initial growth phase because they have unrestricted access to the 446 
highly diffusible public good (white dots).  This pattern reverses at later growth stages, where 447 
cooperators and cheats form distinct clusters, such that most of the public good is shared 448 
among cooperators, giving them a significant fitness advantage. Parameter values:   = 449 
0.0005, 5 = 5, 6 = 510, E = 0.0005. 450 
  451 
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